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This paper uses disaggregated data from a broad cross-section of coun-
tries to empirically assess differences in energy consumption profiles. We
find empirical support for the energy ladder hypothesis, which contends
that as an economy develops, it transitions away from a heavier reliance on
traditional fuel sources towards an increase in the use of modern commer-
cial energy sources. We also find empirical support for the hypothesis that
structural transformation - the idea that as an economy matures, it trans-
forms away from agriculture-based activity into industrial activity and, fi-
nally, fully matures into a service-oriented economy - is an important
driver for the distribution of end-use energy consumption. But, even when
these two hypotheses are taken into account, we continue to find evidence
suggesting that the patterns of energy consumption and generation in the
BRIC economies are importantly different from those of other economies.
But these differences are not systematic; in fact, there appear to be large
differences in the energy consumption portfolios of each of these four rap-
idly growing economies.
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I. INTRODUCTIONONE of the defining characteristics of global energy markets over
the past decade is the rapid growth of energy consumption in the
emerging market economies. The latest Annual BP Statistical
Review of World Energy shows that over the past ten years the average
annual growth rate of global total final energy consumption was just
under one percent. Over this period, energy consumption in OECD
economies declined slightly (see Figure 1). In contrast, the emerging mar-
ket economies experienced a collective growth rate of roughly two per-
cent, making it clear that the developing world has been the primary
engine for global energy consumption growth. Moreover, much of this
growth was concentrated in just four countries - the so-called BRIC
economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (see Figure 2). Taken to-
gether, these four economies accounted for approximately half of the
growth in emerging markets taken as a whole over the past decade.
This growth differential has potentially important implications for
global energy markets going forward. Existing research suggests that the
dynamics of energy consumption in emerging market economies are sig-
nificantly different than the dynamics of energy consumption in the de-
veloped world.3 If the growth differentials observed over the past ten
years persist, the resulting shift in the distribution of global consumption
could give rise to a markedly different energy landscape, one that is much
more heavily weighted toward developments in the emerging markets
(see Figure 3). In light of this, understanding the behavior of energy con-
sumption in the emerging markets-and in the BRICs in particular-is
an increasingly pressing priority for energy economists. While existing
literature has made strides in this direction, understanding differences in
energy consumption profiles across countries very much remains an open
area of research.
This paper takes a step in this direction by using disaggregated micro-
level data to examine energy consumption patterns in a wide cross-sec-
tion of countries. We construct a dataset detailing energy usage in thirty-
five different countries that, taken together, comprise roughly 80 percent
of global total final energy consumption. These data are then used to
empirically assess two alternative theoretical explanations for why energy
consumption portfolios differ across countries.
We examine these data from two separate dimensions. The first is what
we refer to as the "fuel intensity profile," which describes the fraction of
energy consumption either at the aggregate level or disaggregated at the
sectorial - or industry - level, derived from a given source fuel. Here,
we are interested in identifying characteristics that make a country more
(or less) reliant on a specific fuel source for energy generation. The so-
3. See, for example, Gately and Huntington (2002) and Dargay, Gately and Hunting-
ton (2007), (documenting notable differences in oil and/or energy consumption
dynamics across different subsets of countries).
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called "energy ladder hypothesis"' offers a theoretical guide around which
we organize our empirical investigation. This hypothesis contends that as
the level of economic development in a country rises, a substitution takes
place away from using traditional biomass, including wood, agricultural,
and animal waste, as a primary fuel source and into more modern,
cheaper, and cleaner (less polluting) energy sources, such as natural gas,
oil and petroleum products, and electricity.4 This transition along the en-
ergy ladder occurs not only in residential usage, but also in industrial,
commercial, and agricultural usage as technologies and physical infra-
structure for energy generation using these fuels become more wide-
spread. 5
To test this hypothesis we exploit the systematic cross-sectional vari-
ance between fuel intensity profiles and the level of economic develop-
ment. In particular, the fuel intensity profile should vary in such a way
that higher income countries tend to rely more heavily on higher quality,
cleaner fuels. In fact, this is exactly what we find - both in the aggregate
data as well as the disaggregated data at both the sector and industry
level. Thus, the first main result of this paper is that there is strong em-
pirical support for the energy ladder hypothesis as a determinate of a
country's fuel intensity portfolio.
The second dimension we explore is a country's "end-use consumption
profile," which describes the fraction of total energy consumed in a given
sector of the economy or, at a more disaggregated level, in a given indus-
try within a sector. Along this dimension, the goal is to identify charac-
teristics that lead a country to consume a higher (or lower) fraction of
total energy in one particular sector of the economy relative to the con-
sumption in other countries. Our empirical investigation here is guided
by the so-called "structural transformation hypothesis," which keys off
the widely accepted view that an economy's industrial structure changes
endogenously as it undergoes the process of economic development.6 Ec-
onomic activity in underdeveloped countries tends to be focused mainly
in agriculture. But as a country develops, agricultural activity gives way
to industry. At later stages of development, once industrialization is com-
plete, industrial activity tends to decline as the process of development
transforms the economy toward more service-oriented activity.
This shift in the composition of the economy implied by the process of
structural transformation has implications for patterns of end-use energy
4. Hosier (1984), Hosier and Dowd (1987), Leach (1992), Barnes and Floor (1996),
and Heltberg (2004) all examine the energy ladder hypothesis using micro data on
residential usage.
5. Grtibler (2004), Bashmakov (2007), Marcotullio and Schulz (2007) all provide de-
scriptive evidence of how the energy mix changes with economic development.
Burke (2010a, b) explicitly tests this hypothesis in two contributions, concentrating
on the total energy mix and on the electricity mix, respectively.
6. The link between economic development and structural change is owed to Kuznets
(1971).
2012] 555
556 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
consumption.7 We test these implications at both the sector and industry
level and we find that, in general, the data are supportive of the structural
transformation hypothesis. Thus, the second main result of the paper is
that the process of structural transformation is an important driver of
cross-country differences in end-use consumption profiles.
Backed with these two empirically-relevant theoretical explanations for
why and how energy consumption profiles might differ across countries,
we next ask the question: Are the BRICs different? In short, we find that
they are, although apparently not in a systematic way. With regard to the
fuel intensity profile, Russia and Brazil tend to rely more heavily on com-
bustibles, renewables, and waste, while China relies more heavily on coal
usage - even beyond what can be explained by the endowment effect.
Oil and petroleum products make up significantly less of the energy mix
in both China and India than is typical in other countries. In terms of
end-use consumption profiles, with the exception of Brazil, all the BRICs
have significantly less transportation usage relative to other countries. In
addition, China has unusually heavy usage of energy in energy-intensive
industry as well as commercial activities. One way to interpret the results
for China is that the use of lower quality primary fuels for energy genera-
tion and, in turn, the consumption of that energy in primarily industrial
usage is indicative of a country undergoing a structural transformation
out of agricultural and into industrial activity.
This is an important finding both from the perspective of energy econo-
mists trying to understand ongoing market developments as well as from
the perspective of policymakers who ultimately need to deal with the con-
sequences of these developments. As noted above, the BRICs have been
a significant engine of growth for global energy consumption and are
likely to remain so in the future. Accordingly, structural change and the
pace with which the BRICs climb the energy ladder will be crucial for
shaping the energy landscape of the future. The results of this paper
highlight the need for future research to shed more light on energy con-
sumption dynamics - both in the long run as well as at cyclical frequen-
cies - in the emerging markets in general and the BRICs in particular.
A key aspect of this research will inevitably involve delving further into
the data at an even more disaggregated level, suggesting that continuing
to improve the depth, scope, quality, and ease of dissemination of energy
usage statistics should be a top priority.
Regarding related literature, one paper in particular deserves explicit
discussion. Using a panel dataset, Burke (2010b) also finds evidence in
favor of the energy ladder hypothesis. Along this dimension, we reach a
broadly similar conclusion; as such, the results here can be viewed as
complimentary to Burke (2010b). Nevertheless, there are a number of
7. Judson, Schmalensee, and Stoker (1999), Medlock and Soligo (2001), and Schafer
(2005) all examine the implications of structural change for energy demand from
an empirical standpoint. See Arbex and Perobelli (2010) and Stefanski (2010) for
some recent theoretical contributions.
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important differences across the two papers. For example, the two papers
reach similar conclusions despite the use of different data. While the
country coverage in our data is smaller and there is no time series dimen-
sion, we exploit data at a more disaggregated level than does Burke
(2010b). Data differences notwithstanding, the key point of differentia-
tion between the two papers stems from the focus here on behavior of the
BRIC economies as outliers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next part dis-
cusses the data and presents the empirical methodology. The main re-
sults are presented in Part III. Part IV investigates whether or not the
energy consumption profiles of the BRIC economies are significantly dif-
ferent from that of other countries beyond what can be explained by the
core hypotheses. Finally, Part V offers some concluding comments as
well as some suggested areas for further research.
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The data used in the analysis consists of the 2007 annual energy con-
sumption portfolios of thirty-five different countries, listed in Table 1,
from various geographic regions and levels of economic development.
Taken together these thirty-five countries constitute 80 percent of global
total final energy consumption. In what follows, let n be an integer that
indexes country, where ne [1,35]. All data are obtained from the Energy
Balances of OECD and Non-OECD countries published by the Interna-
tional Energy Administration (IEA).
These data are presented along two primary dimensions for each of the
n countries in the sample. The first dimension is energy usage by primary
fuel source. We consider two cuts of the data, one in which electricity is
considered a primary fuel source and one in which it is not. Let the inte-
ger f index primary fuel source, where fle [1,5] indicates energy gener-
ated from: combustibles, renewable energy sources, and waste (fl=1);
coal and peat (f;=2); crude oil and petroleum products (fl=3); natural gas
(fl=4); and electricity (fl=5). Alternatively, f2e [1,7] indicates energy
generated from: combustibles, renewable energy sources, and waste
(f2=1); coal and peat (f2=2); crude oil and petroleum products (f2=3);
natural gas (f2=4); nuclear (f2=5); hydroelectric (f2=6); and geothermal
(f2=7). Thus, fI is the index for primary fuel source under the first cut of
the data and J2 is the index under the second cut. Details are given in
Table 2. Both cuts of the data are considered in the analysis because it is
likely that each yields valuable information about the energy ladder
hypothesis.
The data are also presented along a second dimension of end-use con-
sumption broken out by sector as well as by industry within a given sec-
tor. In terms of notation, let the integer s index sector, where se [1,4]
indicates energy consumed in the following sectors: industrial sector
(s=1); transportation sector (s=2); residential and commercial sector
(s=3); and agricultural sector (s=4). Moving down one level of aggrega-
2012] 557
558 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
tion, let the integer i index industry within sector s. In the raw data
presented by the IEA the upper limit of the index i is conditional on the
sector of interest. For example, the data for the industrial sector can be
disaggregated into thirteen separate industries. Similarly, there are six
industries within the transportation sector and three within the residential
and commercial sector, excluding agriculture, forestry, and fishing, which
we have chosen to break out as a separate category.
When all is said and done, at the most disaggregated level the dataset
consists of either a (23x5) or a (23x7) matrix for every country in the
sample, totaling either 4,025 or 5,635 individual data points across the
entire sample, depending on whether or not electricity is broken out sep-
arately. These data are sufficiently detailed to describe, for example, en-
ergy derived from coal and peat that is consumed in the iron and steel
industry expressed as a fraction of aggregate energy consumption for
country n.
In the interest of simplicity, as well as for the ease of presentation, we
aggregate the industry-level data into just two industries per sector, so
that ie [1,2] regardless of s. For the industrial sector, we group industries
into those that are more energy intensive and those that are less energy
intensive based on classifications presented by the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE).8 The transportation sector is grouped into road transpor-
tation and non-road transportation.9 Finally, both residential and com-
mercial energy usage are broken out as separate industries. The
agricultural sector is not disaggregated further. Details are given in Table
3. The resulting condensed dataset is a (6x5) or (6x7) matrix of data for
each country in the sample, consisting of either 1,050 or 1,470 individual
data points, again depending on whether or not electricity is broken out
separately.
Our goal in the analysis is to explain cross-country differences in en-
ergy consumption portfolios broken out along the two dimensions of fuel
source and end-use consumption. Before we provide formal definitions
of the metrics that we will use to empirically describe these two dimen-
sions, some additional notation is useful.
At the lowest level of aggregation, let c,,f,,; denote consumption for
country n of fuel f in industry i of sector s. At the other extreme, at the
highest level of aggregation, let C,,,...,. denote aggregate energy consump-
tion for country n across all fuels and end-use sectors and industries,
where C,,.,.,. is defined as:
8. The following industries are classified as "more energy intensive": iron and steel,
chemical and petrochemical, non-ferrous metals, non-metallic minerals, and paper
pulp and printing. The remainder-transportation equipment, machinery, mining
and quarrying, food and tobacco, wood and wood products, construction, and tex-
tile and leather-are classified as "less energy intensive."
9. Road transportation consists of both private and commercial transportation. Non-
road transportation consists of domestic aviation, rail, pipeline transport, and do-
mestic navigation.
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=n I , Y nfsi
fs i
Thus, our notation has a consumption aggregate denoted by an upper-
case C,.... The subscript n,-,*,* reveals that the aggregate is for a given
country, n, while the (lack of) dots (*) reveals the level of
(dis)aggregation. Generally speaking, a dot in place of a given subscript
n, f, s, or i means that we have aggregated over that dimension, so more
dots in the subscript implies a higher level of aggregation. For example,
C,.,.,.. is aggregate consumption summed over all fuels, f, sectors, s, and
industries, i; C,f,.,. is consumption by fuel f aggregated across all sectors,
s, and industries, i; C,,, is consumption by sector s aggregated across all
fuels, f, and industries, i; Cn,j.. is consumption by fuel fin sector s aggre-
gated across all industries, i, and so forth.
With this notation in mind, we turn now to a formal definition of the
variables of interest and a description of the empirical models that will be
used to explain them.
A. FUEL INTENSITY PORTFOLIo
The empirical metric used to summarize the energy portfolio along the
fuel source dimension is fuel intensity. We aim to explain the cross-coun-
try variation in fuel intensity at three different levels of aggregation: the
aggregate as well as sector and industry level.
Aggregate fuel intensity is simply a measure of the share of aggregate
energy consumption accounted for by fuel f aggregated across all sectors
and industries for country n. A formal definition is as follows:
Cn,f,,. _ s ZCnr1~AFI =
Cn,-,.,- E/ s, Li Cnj~s
where AFI denotes aggregate fuel intensity; C,,,1.,. denotes aggregate en-
ergy consumption accounted for by fuel f across all sectors and industries;
and C,,,.,. is aggregate energy consumption across all fuels, sectors, and
industries.
Disaggregating one level gives sector-level fuel intensity, which mea-
sures the share of energy consumption in sector s accounted for by fuel f,
formally defined as:
SFI= " P=
Cn,f,S,. _ L CnfsOi
where SFI denotes sector-level fuel intensity; C,,f,,. denotes energy con-
sumption in sector s accounted for by fuel f across all industries, i; and
C,,,.,,. is energy consumption within sector s across all fuels and industries.
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Finally, the lowest level of aggregation gives industry-level fuel inten-
sity, which measures the share of energy consumption in industry i of sec-
tor s accounted for by fuel f. A formal definition follows:
IFI- -
Cn,,si ZJ Cnfsj
where IFI denotes industry-level fuel intensity; C,, denotes energy con-
sumption in industry i of sector s accounted for by fuel f; and C,,,.,,; is
energy consumption within industry i of sector s across all fuels.
Note that the three indices, AFI, SFI, and IFI, are each normalized
differently. The aggregate index is created by normalizing with total en-
ergy consumption. It measures the intensity of coal usage in aggregate
energy consumption, for example. The sectorial-level index is created by
normalizing by total energy consumption within the sector. It measures
the intensity of oil usage within the industrial sector, for example. Fi-
nally, the industry-specific index is created by normalizing by total energy
consumption within an industry specific to a given sector. It measures the
use of renewables and waste in the non-energy intensive industrial sector,
for example.
1. Empirical Model
The goal is to explain the fuel intensity portfolio at each of three levels
of aggregation for a given country. At the aggregate level, our analysis
aims at explaining, for example, why India is more reliant on combus-
tibles, renewables, and waste for energy generation than is either Brazil
or Germany. At lower levels of aggregation, the point of our analysis is
to identify country characteristics that can help to explain the difference
between the fuel intensity portfolios in two different countries at the sec-
tor level-why Mexico uses more energy generated from oil and petro-
leum products and less energy generated from coal and peat than does
the United States, for example. Going one step further, we would also
like to explain cross-country differences at the industry level within a
given sector.
There are two primary hypotheses for structural factors that might be
important in determining the fuel intensity profile for a given country,
regardless of the level of disaggregation of the data. First, resource en-
dowment is likely to be important. All else equal, countries that are rich
in coal reserves, such as the United States, are likely to use coal more
intensely to meet domestic energy demand at all levels of aggregation
relative to countries where coal is relatively scarce. A similar case can be
made for oil; recent experience in Saudi Arabia, where the use of crude
oil for electricity generation is increasingly frequent, stands out as a case
in point. A less dramatic, but equally relevant, example is the extensive
use of natural gas in Russia. In the simplest terms, exploiting domesti-
cally abundant energy resources is desirable for both economic as well as
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political reasons and we would expect a country's fuel intensity profile to
reflect this.
The second hypothesis for determining a given country's fuel intensity
profile relates to the level of economic development. Existing research
has drawn links between economic development and the development of
energy infrastructure. This is commonly referred to in the literature as
the "energy ladder," whereby economic development leads to maturation
in the technology available for energy provision. As a country develops it
cycles from relatively inefficient fuels, such as combustibles, to more effi-
cient fuels, such as coal, and eventually matures to the current technologi-
cal frontier in energy provision, exploiting refined fuels derived from
petroleum as well as natural gas and electricity.
We test these two candidate hypotheses to explain cross-country differ-
ences in fuel intensity profiles using the following regression framework:
FI = ff + f4ENDOWnj + ,2fRGDPn + pfREGIONn + En (1.)
where FI is a fuel intensity measure defined at one of the three levels of
aggregation (that is, in our empirical analysis FI is given by one of the
three variables A FI, SFI, or IFI, defined in the previous section, depend-
ing on the level of disaggregation desired) for fuel f in country n; EN-
DOWf is the share of global proved reserves for fuel f held by country n,
which is intended to capture resource abundance for that particular fuel;
RGDPn is (log) real per capita GDP for country n, which is a direct mea-
sure of the level of economic development; finally, REGIONn is a vector
of dummy variables, each of which takes on a value of one if country n is
classified as a European, Developed Asian, Latin American, Emerging
Asian, or Emerging Other economy, respectively, and takes on a value of
zero otherwise. Accordingly, the estimated coefficients on the regional
dummies are interpreted as the regional effect relative to North America.
The specific regions are chosen based on existing literature, which shows
that these country groupings are relevant for explaining cross-country dif-
ferences in oil consumption. The dummies are intended to control for all
other unobserved factors within a given region that may help to deter-
mine the fuel intensity profile. Finally, the error term is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed, En-N(0,Gn2 ). The equation is esti-
mated using simple ordinary least squares (OLS).
Within this regression framework we test the following two hypotheses:
HEndowment: 1{ > 0
and
HEnergyLadder f2' < 0 for f, 1, 2); f2 = (1, 2}
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The first tests the statistical validity of the endowment hypothesis. If
the hypothesis is valid we would expect that the aggregate fuel intensity
of fuel fin country n is Increasing in the resource endowment of that fuel
and thus the coefficient estimate for P 2 should be positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero.
The second tests the validity of the energy ladder hypothesis. Here, we
would expect the aggregate fuel intensity of lower quality fuels such as
combustibles, renewables, and waste, V 2=1), coal, and peat (f,2=2) to
decrease as a country becomes more developed and makes its way "up
the energy ladder" as it ada/opts more efficient, cleaner technologies for
energy generation. Hence, for these fuels we would expect the coefficient
estimate for P2 to be negative and significantly different from zero. In
contrast, for the higher quality fuels such as oil (f,2=3), natural gas
V1,2=4), and electricity (fl=5), or alternatively when electricity is not bro-
ken out separately, as in nuclear (f2=5), hydroelectric (f2=6), and geo-
thermal (f2=7), we expect that aggregate fuel intensity should increase
with the level of development. We would expect the coefficient estimate
for P2 to be positive and significantly different from zero for these fuels.
B. END-USE PORTFOLIO
The second dimension of the energy portfolio that we would like to
explain is the cross-country variation in end-use consumption. We sum-
marize this aspect of the energy portfolio with the metric energy usage,
defined at two levels of disaggregation.
Sector-level energy usage measures the share of aggregate energy con-
sumption accounted for by sector s aggregated across all fuels and indus-
tries for country n. A formal definition is as follows:
SEU = C _ -f i C~, S
Cn,-,-,- Er Zs Zi Cn,f,s,i
where SEU denotes sectorial energy usage; C,,.,s,. denotes aggregate en-
ergy consumption accounted for by sector s across all fuels, f, and indus-
tries, i.
Similarly, moving down one level of aggregation, industry-level energy
usage measures the share of aggregate energy consumption accounted for
by industry i aggregated across all fuels, f, for country n. We formalize
this as
IEU Y-f CffL
Cn,.,.,. f Es Zi Cn,,si
where IEU denotes industrial-level energy usage; C,,.,,; denotes energy
consumption accounted for by industry i within sector s, aggregated
across all fuels, f.
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1. Empirical Model
With regard to end-use consumption, our analysis aims to explain why,
for example, consumption in the industrial sector comprises a larger frac-
tion of total energy consumed in Argentina (41.1 percent) as opposed to
Hong Kong (28.6 percent). At a higher level of disaggregation, road
transport (consisting of both passenger and commercial transport activ-
ity) comprises 33.1 percent of aggregate energy consumption in Spain,
but only 21.7 percent in Canada. What can explain the difference? In
short, as with fuel intensity above, the point of the analysis here is to
identify characteristics that can help to explain cross-country differences
in end-use consumption portfolios at both the sectorial and the industry
level.
We examine three hypotheses. The first two relate to sector size and
the energy efficiency of the sector in question, respectively. All else
equal, as the economic size of a given sector increases we might expect
energy consumption within that sector to grow as a fraction of total en-
ergy consumption. On the other hand, as the energy efficiency of a given
sector increases we might expect energy consumption within that sector
to decline as a fraction of total energy consumption.
Beyond size and efficiency, we also explore the structural transforma-
tion hypothesis. There is a well-known, established literature dating to
Kuznets (1971), which contends that a country's industrial structure
changes endogenously as it undergoes the process of economic develop-
ment. Initially, for countries at low levels of development, agricultural
production constitutes the largest share of economic activity. But as an
economy begins to develop, industrialization causes the share of industry
in total output to rise as economic activity moves away from agriculture
and into heavy industry. Later phases of development tend to be charac-
terized by a decline in manufacturing activity as industrialization eventu-
ally gives way to a transformation toward a more service-oriented
economy.
Transformation of the industrial structure, of course, has implications
for energy usage. For countries at low levels of economic development,
the structural transformation hypothesis suggests that end-use consump-
tion profiles should be weighted toward greater energy usage in the resi-
dential and agricultural sectors and relatively low weights on industry.
As a country develops and undergoes the process of industrialization, in-
dustries' share of total energy usage should rise at the expense of agricul-
ture and residential usage. Finally, at high levels of development, after
industrialization has occurred and the transformation toward a more ser-
vice-oriented economy is underway, the share of residential and commer-
cial usage should rise at the expense of industry.
Thus, there are two empirical implications of the structural transforma-
tion hypothesis for energy usage that can be tested, both of which exploit
the compositional shift of economic activity implied by the process of
structural transformation. The first keys off the change in industries'
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share of total energy usage, which according to the structural transforma-
tion hypothesis should be increasing with income for relatively low levels
of economic development - reflecting the effect of industrialization on
energy usage-and then decreasing for sufficiently high levels of develop-
ment - reflecting deindustrialization as the economy transforms into ser-
vice-oriented activity. The second keys off the change in residential and
commercial usage. According to the structural transformation hypothe-
sis, residential usage should be declining with income at low levels of de-
velopment and then increasing, along with commercial usage, at
sufficiently high levels of development.
We test the three candidate hypotheses to explain cross-country differ-
ences in end-use energy consumption profiles using the following general
regression framework:
EUn = fl' + flfSIZEns + ffEFFICIENCYn,s (2.)
+flRGDPn + Jf3RGDP + Ps REGION. + E,
where EUn is the end-use consumption measure defined at one of the two
levels of aggregation (either SEUS,, or IEUs,,n as defined in the previous
section depending on the level of disaggregation desired) for fuel s in
country n; SIZE, is the value added (expressed in percentage terms) to
sector s in total output for country n, as in the previous subsection; EF-
FICIENCYs is the total energy consumed in sector s, measured in units
of thousands of tons of oil equivalent, expressed per United States dollar
of real GDP; RGDPn is (log) real per capita GDP for country n which, for
reasons discussed below, enters quadratically into the regression frame-
work to capture the non-linear response of the sectorial and industry
shares to income at different stages of a structural transformation; finally,
as above we include the vector of regional dummies, REGIONn, to con-
trol for other unobserved factors. The error term is assumed to be iid and
normally distributed, En~N(,on2 ). In order to address possible en-
dogeneity between our metric for end-use consumption and the proxy for
sectorial energy efficiency, the equation is estimated using two stage least
squares (2SLS), using aggregate energy efficiency as an instrument for
energy efficiency at the sectorial level.
Within this regression framework, we examine whether or not sector
size is an important determinate of the end-use energy consumption pro-
file by testing the following hypothesis:
HsLze: #S~ > 0
We expect that the share of total energy consumption in sector s is
increasing in the economic size of the sector as measured by value added
in GDP, so that the coefficient estimate for 13, A{s} should be positive and
significantly different from zero.
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Next, we test the validity of the hypothesis that increased energy effi-
ciency in sector s leads to a decrease in that sector's share of aggregate
energy consumption.
HEfficiency: fl< 0
If sectorial-level efficiency is an important determinate for the end-use
energy consumption profile, we would expect the coefficient estimate for
P2^(s} to be negative and significantly different from zero.
Finally, we test the validity of the structural transformation hypothesis
as follows:
HTransform. fl > 0,ff <0 for s = 1o f < 0, fl > 0 for s = 3
As discussed above, the hypothesis predicts that industries' share of
total energy usage will have an inverse U-shaped relationship with the
level of income, which should be captured by the quadratic income term
with P 3s=1 > 0 and p4 s=1 < 0. In contrast, commercial and residential usage
should have a U-shaped relationship with the level of income, falling for
low levels of development and then growing at a sufficiently high level of
development, which should be captured by the quadratic income term
with P3s3 < 0 and P4 s=3 > 0. For the final two sectors, we expect transporta-
tion's share to increase with income, so that 3 s=2 > 0, and agriculture's
share to decrease, so that P3s=' < 0, but do not necessarily have reason to
think that either should enter into the regression in a non-linear way.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results are presented in the following two subsections. The
first examines cross-country differences in fuel intensity profiles, while
the second examines differences in end-use consumption.
A. FUEL INTENSITY PROFILE
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the share of total energy usage
by source, broken out with electricity (panel A) and without electricity
(panel B). The Table shows that the dominate energy source comes from
crude oil and petroleum products, which alone accounts for nearly half of
all energy consumed globally. Panel A shows that electricity accounts for
about 20 percent of global energy consumption, followed by natural gas
at roughly 15 percent. The remaining share is comprised of combustibles,
renewables, and waste as well as coal and peat, which accounts for under
15 percent of global energy consumption. Panel B shows that when elec-
tricity usage is broken down into source fuels, the share of coal, peat, and
natural gas in global energy usage rises (indicating that these are two im-
portant sources of electricity generation). Additionally, nuclear, hydroe-
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lectric, and geothermal power, taken together, account for a relatively
small fraction of global energy usage.
Comparing the developed economies to the emerging market econo-
mies hints at some key differences when energy usage profiles are broken
out by primary source. The data show that, relative to emerging market
economies, developed economies tend to rely more heavily on petroleum
products, natural gas, and electricity as primary sources of energy. In
contrast, developing economies tend to rely more heavily on coal and
peat as well as combustibles, renewables, and waste. Thus, even a cursory
glance at the data suggests that there may be some systematic difference
in the energy usage portfolio between the two sets of countries.
A more formal assessment can be found in Tables 5a and 5b, which
present the regression results for Equation 1 with and without electricity
broken out, respectively. The Tables show a set of results for each fuel,
with one set corresponding to the regression without the regional dum-
mies (first column of numbers) and the second set corresponding to the
regression with the dummies (second column).
Concentrating on the first column of numbers for each fuel in Table Sa,
we see that there is strong support for the energy ladder hypothesis
across nearly all the fuels when electricity is included. For all five fuels
the estimated coefficient has the predicted sign and is significantly differ-
ent from zero at the 90 percent confidence level. As real per capita GDP
rises, countries shift their aggregate fuel intensity portfolios away from
lower quality, more polluting fuels, such as combustibles, renewables, and
waste as well as coal and peat, into higher quality, cleaner fuels, such as
refined petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity. Moreover, in
looking at the quantitative magnitude of the coefficients and the preci-
sion with which they are estimated, the evidence in favor of the energy
ladder hypothesis is clearly strongest at the two extremes of the ladder.
There is a large, highly significant, negative correlation between income
and the lower end of the quality ladder - the usage of combustibles,
renewables, and waste - while the opposite is true at the higher end of
the ladder, as reflected in electricity usage. The coefficients for the inter-
mediate fuels tend to be smaller in magnitude, and, although many are
statistically significant, taken as a whole, they tend to be more imprecisely
estimated. When electricity is broken out into source fuels, Table 5b
shows that while there is still evidence in favor of the energy ladder hy-
pothesis, it is somewhat weaker. This is likely due to the fact that energy
sources higher on the ladder - nuclear, hydroelectric, and geothermal -
tend to comprise only a small fraction of total energy usage.
In contrast to the energy ladder hypothesis, there is only mild support
for the endowment hypothesis. Although the estimated coefficients have
the correct sign for all three fuels for which we have an empirical proxy
for endowment available, only in the case of natural gas do we find a
robust significant correlation between proved reserves and the share in
total energy usage (the endowment effect on coal is sensitive to whether
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or not electricity is broken out separately). Natural gas, more so than
coal or oil and petroleum products, may be particularly susceptible to the
endowment hypothesis given the relatively large capital expenses associ-
ated with international trade in natural gas either via pipeline or in lique-
fied form.
Moving to the regressions with the regional dummies, we find that sup-
port for the energy ladder hypothesis is largely robust to controlling for
unobserved region-specific characteristics. With regard to the country
dummies themselves, two things stand out. First, the Asian economies -
both developed and developing - tend to rely heavily on coal for energy
generation relative to other countries in the sample. Importantly, this is
true even when controlling for resource endowment. Second, the other
emerging category, which includes Israel, Russia, and Saudi Arabia,
stands out for its high reliance on electricity usage.
Extending the analysis to disaggregated data on fuel usage at the secto-
rial and industry levels reveals that much of the support for the energy
ladder hypothesis stems from the industrial as well as the residential and
commercial sectors. Fuel intensity in the transportation and agricultural
sectors does not, in general, fit well into our hypothesized determinates,
likely reflecting the relative lack of substitutability in fuel usage in both of
these sectors. For the sake of brevity, I do not present the full set of
disaggregated regression results and, instead, simply highlight some of the
interesting insights.10
Support for the energy ladder hypothesis comes primarily from the in-
dustrial as well as the residential and commercial sectors, and, much like
the aggregate data, tends to be strongest at the two extreme ends of the
energy ladder. Specifically, usage of combustibles, renewables, and waste
falls significantly with income in both residential as well as commercial
usage and also in non-energy intensive industries. At the other extreme
of the energy ladder, electricity usage rises significantly in both residen-
tial and commercial usage as well as in both energy-intense and non-in-
tense industrial usage. The evidence is somewhat more mixed for the
intermediate fuels in these sectors. Coal usage falls with income amongst
energy-intensive industries. Industrial usage of oil and petroleum prod-
ucts is interesting because it falls with income for energy-intense indus-
tries, but rises with income for energy non-intense industries, suggesting
that there is fuel switching within industries' usage itself. Natural gas us-
age rises with income in non-energy intensive industrial usage as well as
in both residential and commercial usage, although these results are not
robust to the inclusion of regional dummies. Finally, there is very little, if
any, evidence for the energy ladder hypothesis in the transport sector,
while oil and petroleum product usage declines with income in the agri-
cultural sector.
10. The full set of results would require a set of tables describing results from sixty
different regressions, which is too cumbersome to include in this paper. But the
results are available upon request.
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B. END-USE PROFILE
Table 6 presents summary statistics for the share of total energy usage
by sector. For the sample as a whole, industrial usage accounts for the
largest share of global energy consumption at 37 percent, while transpor-
tation and residential and commercial usage each account for roughly 30
percent. Agricultural energy usage accounts for the remaining 2.5%. Al-
though not shown, this distribution carries over to the industry-level
within each sector as well. Moreover, in contrast to aggregate fuel inten-
sity, a cursory glance at the data reveals very little difference in the secto-
rial distribution of energy usage between developed and emerging market
countries.
Regression results for Equation 2 are presented in Table 6 at the secto-
rial level. Again, we present two sets of results for each end-use sector,
one with regional dummies (first column for each sector) and one without
regional dummies (second column). Generally speaking, the results are
robust across both specifications. There is little evidence that either sec-
tor size or sector-specific efficiency is a robust determinate of energy us-
age." There is, however, some support for the structural transformation
hypothesis. For industrial usage, the coefficient on (logged) real GDP is
positive and significant while the coefficient on the log real GDP squared
is negative and significant. This indicates that the share of industrial en-
ergy usage starts out at a low level for relatively undeveloped economies.
As these economies grow, the industrial share of energy usage increases
reflecting the process of industrialization which is a key component of
economic development. But, once a country reaches a certain level of
development, deindustrialization occurs as the economy transforms into
more service-oriented activity; hence, industry share of total energy con-
sumption begins to fall once an economy has reached a certain level of
development. In our estimates, this peak occurs at a real per capita level
of roughly USD $10,500, about the level of development of Brazil. This
inverse U-shape for the share of industrial energy usage is very much in
line with the structural transformation hypothesis.
For residential and commercial energy usage, we see the opposite pat-
tern. The coefficient on (logged) real GDP is negative and significant
while the coefficient on the log real GDP squared is positive and signifi-
cant. This is also in line with the structural transformation hypothesis in
the sense that at low levels of economic development residential usage
carries a large fraction of total usage, but this declines as an economy
grows and industrialization occurs. Eventually, the economy hits a point
at which the emergence of the service sector causes the share of commer-
cial usage to increase. In addition, the share of residential usage in-
creases as the demand for energy-intense consumer durables begins to
11. We do find that higher efficiency in the residential and commercial sectors leads to
less energy usage in those sectors, but only when the regional dummies are in-
cluded. Also, a larger agricultural sector appears to be associated with a larger
share of energy usage in that sector.
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pick up at sufficiently high income levels. The net effect gives rise to a U-
shaped pattern for the share of residential and commercial usage taken as
a whole. According to the regression results reported in Table 7, the
turning point at which residential and commercial usage stops declining
and begins to rise is roughly USD $14,000, about the level of Mexico or
Argentina.
In contrast with industrial usage and residential and commercial usage,
neither the transportation nor the agricultural sector fit neatly into the
structural transformation hypothesis. For both, the estimated coefficients
on the level of income are positive while the squared term is negative, but
both are insignificant. While the size of the agricultural sector helps to
explain cross-country variation in the agriculture share of total energy
usage, we did not have much success in explaining cross-country variation
in energy usage with the transportation sector.
Table 8 shows regression results for the industry-level data. Support
for the structural transformation hypothesis is not robust at the disaggre-
gate level, but as we will see in the next section, the BRIC economies
have a lot to do with this finding. In particular, we do not find evidence
of a U-shaped pattern in industrial usage. For the residential and com-
mercial sector, disaggregation reveals that the nonlinear relationship at
the sectorial level is driven primarily by residential usage. In contrast,
commercial usage, like agricultural usage, appears to be driven by sector
size.
IV. ARE THE BRICS DIFFERENT?
Much of the impetus for the shift toward emerging market economies
and away from developed economies as the primary driver of global en-
ergy consumption growth has come from the so-called BRIC economies
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Not surprisingly, these economies
have garnered a lot of attention from energy and financial market partici-
pants as well as from policymakers interested in understanding commod-
ity market developments. Given that the BRIC economies are playing a
larger and larger role in global energy consumption, it seems natural to
ask whether there is something inherently different about the consump-
tion patterns in these countries.
Methodologically, we answer this question by simply introducing
dummy variables into the regression Equations land 2 for the BRIC
economies individually. If energy usage in the BRICs is different in some
way not already addressed by the hypotheses laid out in the previous sec-
tion, then the dummies will capture this difference.
We are interested in answering two questions. First, how does the in-
clusion of the BRIC dummies influence our conclusions regarding our
hypothesized determinates of the energy consumption portfolio? Second,
given that we control for these hypothesized determinates, do the BRICs
themselves have systematically different consumption portfolios from
other countries? Results are reported below in two subsections.
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A. FUEL INTENSITY
Referring back to Table 4, the fuel intensity profiles of the BRIC econ-
omies stand out in two respects. First, they tend to rely more heavily on
combustibles, renewables, and waste, as well as coal, for energy genera-
tion relative to other economies. Taken together these two fuel sources
constitute nearly 35 percent of total energy consumption, whereas com-
parable numbers for the developed economies and non-BRIC emerging
market countries are 9 and 15 percent, respectively. Second, they tend to
rely less heavily on oil and petroleum products, which constitute 31 per-
cent of the fuel intensity profile in the BRIC economies as opposed to 48
percent and 52 percent, respectively, in the developed and non-BRIC
emerging markets. Thus, a preliminary look at the data suggests that the
BRICs may indeed be different with respect to the fuel intensity profile.
Tables 9a and 9b present regression results from Equation 1 estimated
with the separate BRIC dummies, which are directly comparable to what
was reported above in Tables 5a and 5b both with and without electricity,
respectively. The Tables reveal that the high share of combustibles,
renewables, and waste in the BRIC economies is largely driven by non-
electricity related usage primary in Brazil and Russia. A look at the dis-
aggregated data (not shown) reveals that for Brazil the high share of
combustibles, renewables, and waste comes from non-energy intensive in-
dustries as well as both road and non-road transportation. For Russia,
the high share stems primarily from commercial usage. The strong coal
usage amongst the BRICs is driven by China, which uses coal more in-
tensely than the other countries in all four sectors. Importantly, this is
true even after controlling for China's relatively large endowment of coal.
On the other hand, the relatively low share of oil and petroleum products
in the fuel intensity profile of the BRIC economies appears to be largely
due to India and China. In summary, even after controlling for some
hypothesized determinates of the fuel intensity profile, the BRIC econo-
mies still seem to be different from other countries in the sense that they
have an over-reliance on lower quality fuels and an under-reliance on oil
and petroleum products relative to other countries.
With respect to the main conclusions regarding the determinates of the
fuel intensity profile the inclusion of the BRIC dummies appears to have
little impact. Even after allowing for a country-specific effect for each of
the BRIC economies, we continue to see strong support of the energy
ladder hypothesis, principally at the two extremes of the energy ladder.
For the intermediate fuels, the evidence is weaker. For oil and petroleum
products, support for the energy ladder hypothesis is not robust to the
inclusion of the BRIC dummies due to the low usage in India and China.
Instead, controlling for each of these two countries separately strengthens
empirical support of the endowment hypothesis.
Disaggregating data to the sectorial and industry level offers little in
the way of new insights. The results are essentially unchanged relative to
those discussed in the previous section.
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B. END-USE CONSUMPTION
Table 6 shows that although there do not appear to be any Table differ-
ences between developed and developing countries with respect to end-
use consumption, there do appear to be big differences in the BRIC econ-
omies. In particular, the BRICs stand out as different in nearly every
sector and also within industries in a given sector. The BRICs tend to
have a larger share of industrial energy usage - nearly 10 percent higher
than either developed economies or the non-BRIC emerging market
economies - and this extends down to both energy-intensive and non-
energy-intensive industries. The BRICs also have a higher percentage of
energy use in agricultural activity - nearly double that of either devel-
oped or non-BRIC emerging market economies. In contrast, transporta-
tion does not play as large a role in the BRICs as it does in other
economies. When we look at the disaggregated industry data we can see
that this is primarily due to low energy usage in road transport. Finally,
residential energy usage carries a larger share in BRIC energy consump-
tion relative to the rest of the world, while commercial energy usage plays
a smaller share.
Regression results from Equation 2 estimated with separate BRIC
dummies are presented in Table 10 and are directly comparable to results
presented in Table 7. At the sectorial level, it turns out that once we
control for the hypothesized determinates of the end-use consumption
profile, industrial energy consumption in the BRICs is not significantly
different from other countries. Thus, contrary to the impression created
by the unconditional data in Table 6, it appears that there is nothing dif-
ferent about industrial energy usage in the BRICs per se; instead, they
simply tend to have higher shares of industrial usage primarily because
these economies are undergoing a period of rapid industrialization. This
sectorial-level result does not necessarily apply, however, when the data
are disaggregated down to the industry level. Table 11 shows that China,
in particular, is importantly different in that it has a very high share of
energy-intense industrial energy usage.
Interestingly, whereas we had little success in explaining cross-country
differences in transportation usage in Table 7, once we control for the
BRIC economies the picture changes. The BRICs - and, in particular,
Russia, India, and China - are light in transportation usage relative to
other countries. Moreover, once we control for the BRICs, we find that
sector size appears to be the main determinate of cross country consump-
tion differences in this sector. A look at the disaggregated data in Table
11 reveals that low Russian transportation usage is driven by non-road
industries, while low Chinese and Indian transport consumption is driven
by road transportation (likely due to the relatively low number of auto-
mobiles per capita in these economies). Interestingly, once we control for
the BRICs we see that economic development has an inverse U-shaped
relationship with energy consumption in road transportation.
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Tables 10 and 11 indicate that the BRICs really don't stand out in a
robust systematic way in terms of residential and commercial or agricul-
tural usage.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper used a dataset detailing energy usage in a broad cross-sec-
tion of countries to test two hypotheses regarding determinates of the
differences in consumption portfolios across countries-the energy lad-
der hypothesis and the structural transformation hypothesis. We found
statistical evidence to support both of these hypotheses. Moreover, the
paper also showed that even when these theoretical determinants of the
energy consumption portfolio are taken into account, the energy con-
sumption portfolios of the BRIC economies are still notably different
from those of other countries. The BRICs tend to rely more heavily on
lower quality fuel sources - combustibles, renewables, and waste, as well
as coal and peat - then predicted by the energy ladder hypothesis and, in
terms of end-use consumption, tend to under consume energy in the
transportation sector. It is also clear that China consumes an unusually
large fraction of its total energy consumption in energy-intensive indus-
trial activity - even more than what can be explained by the structural
transformation hypothesis.
The policy implications of this paper are relatively straight-forward.
From the perspective of energy analysts and policymakers, the empirical
results presented here suggest that understanding global energy market
developments requires a more intense focus on developments at the
country and industry-specific levels. In this sense, this paper is very much
in line with the broad conclusions of Stefanski (2009) and Arbex and Per-
obelli (2010), which emphasize that microeconomic foundations are im-
portant for understanding global energy developments. Future empirical
work should concentrate on examining how far the systematic differences
in energy consumption portfolios can go in explaining differences in the
dynamics of energy consumption over the business cycle.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1:
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Table 1. Countries in sample, by region
Developed Economies Emerging Market Economies
North Developed Latin Emerging Emerging
Europe America Asia America Asia Other BRICs
Austria Canada Australia Argentina Hong Kong Israel Brazil
Belgium Mexico Japan Chile Indonesia Saudi Arabia China
Finland US South Korea Colombia Malaysia India
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Table 2. Energy usage by primary fuel source
Cut One Cut Two
(with electricity) (without electricity)
fl e (1,5) f2 e (1,7)
Combustibles, renewables, and waste Combustibles, renewables, and waste
Coal and peat Coal and peat
Crude oil and petroleum products Crude oil and petroleum products





Table 3. Energy usage by end-use consumption category
Sector Industry Sector Industry
Industrial Sector Transportation Sector
(s = 1) (s =2)
Energy intensive Chemicals and petrochemicals Road Road
(i = 1) Iron and steel (i = 1)
Non-ferrous metals
Non-metallic minerals
Paper pulp and printing
Non-energy intensive Construction Non-road Domestic aviation
(i = 2) Food and tabacco (i = 2) Rail
Machinery Pipeline transport
Mining and quarrying Domestic navigation
Textile and leather Non-specified
Transprot equipment
Wood and wood products
Non-specified
Residential and commercial Sector Agricultural Sector
(s = 3) (s =4)
Residential Residential Agricultural Agricultural
(i = 1) (i 1) Forestry
Commercial Commercial and public service Fishing
(i = 2)
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Table 4. Data summary for fuel intensity profile
Panel A: With Electricity Panel 11: Without Electricity






















Combust., Renew., and Waste
( = 1)
Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N
0.091 0.045 0.105 0 0.409 30 0.101 0.050 0.110 0 0.409 30
0.058 0.045 0.051 0.0)7 0.169 19 0.075 0.050 0.075 0.013 0.259 19
0.213 0.218 0.172 0.0X)6 0)409 4 0.216 0.222 0.171 0.012 0.409 4
0.102 0.037 0.119 0 0.351 11 0.104 0.038 0.120 0 0.351 11
Coal and Peat Coal and Peat
(f = 2) ( = 2)
Mean Median St. 3ev. Min. Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N
0.047 0.026 0.062 0 0.330 34 0.112 0.077 0.113 0 0.518 34
0.029 0.022 0.020 0.008 0.090 19 0.089 0.064 0.059 0.08)8 0.230 19
0.131 0.080 0.138 0.035 0.330 4 0.220 0.161 0.210 0.039 0.518 4
0048 0.029 0.052 0 0.144 11 0.112 0.080 0.128 0 0.448 11
Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Crude Oil and Petroleum Products
(f, = 3) (f2 = 3)
Mean Median St. Dev. Min, Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N
0.479 0.478 0.118 0.232 0.763 34 0.495 0.487 0.129 0.251 0.812 34
0.488 0.478 0.085 0.317 0.639 19 0.501 0.487 0.090 0.330 0.669 19
0.308 0.276 0.097 0.232 0.446 4 0.316 0.281 0.094 0.251 0.451 4
0.523 0.517 0.127 0.332 0.763 11 0.547 0.524 0.145 0.351 0.812 11
Natural Gas Natural Gas
(f - 4) (f, = 4)
Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N
0144 0.128 0.107 0 0.363 30 0.217 0.206 0.131 0.024 0.556 30
0.177 0.169 0.093 0.016 0.340 19 0.238 0.221 (.111 0.024 0.456 19
0.111 0.052 0.130 0.036 0.305 4 0.179 0.060 0.252 0.039 0.556 4
0.102 0.084 0.112 0 0.363 11 0.196 0.172 0.118 0.061 0.447 11
Electricity and Heat Nuclear Power
(f = 5) (f2 = 5)



















































Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N
0.039 0.019 0.048 0 0.151 30
0.039 0.017 0.049 0 0.146 19
0.055 0.026 0.064 0.019 0.151 4
0.034 0.010 0.045 0 0.128 11
Geothermal Power
(f = 7)
Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N
0.007 0.003 0.012 0 0.058 30
0.008 0.005 0.006 0 0.022 19
0.002 0.002 0.002 0 0.004 4
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Table 5a. Cross-country differences in aggregate fuel intensity profiles
(AFI), with electricity
Combustables, Oil and
Renewables and Petroleum Electricity and
Waste Coal and Peat Products Natural Gas Heat Generation
(fV 1) (f, 2) (f= 3) (f = 4) (f = 5)
Constant 1.05 1.22 0.42 0.27 0.004 -0.18 -0.26 -0.02 -0.3 -. 43
(7.12) (5.78) (3.85) (1.86) (0.02) (-0.48) (-1.23) (-0.07) (-1.81) (-1.70)
Europe 0.04 . 0.04 . -0.09 -0.004 . 0.05
(0.92) . (1.29) . (1.05) . (-0.06) . (1.06)
Developed Asia . -0.01 . 0.07 . -0.02 -0.06 . 0.06
(-0.24) . (1.85) . (0.21) . (-0.75) . (0.85)
Latin America . -0.02 . 0.02 . 0.01 0.01 . 0.03
(-0.33) (0.39) . (0.11) . (0.84) . (0.47)
Emerging Asia . -0.01 0.09 . -0.01 . -0.1 . 0.08
(-0.23) (2.38) . (-0.14) . (1.34) . (1.32)
Emerging Other . -0.09 . -0.004 0.01 . -0.14 41.12
(-1.66) . (-0.09) . (0.11) . (1.56) . (1.95)
Economic Development -0.22 -0.26 .0.09 -0.06 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.05 01.12 0.14
(6.53) (-5.64) (-3.48) (2.01) (1.94) (1.92) (1.92) (0.68) (3.20) (2.50)
Resource Endowment . 0.23 0.32 0.6 -0.17 0.83 1.25
(1.63) (2.22) (0.62) (0.13) (2.03) (2.49)
Ri 0.56 0.67 0.33 0.57 0.11 0.18 (.18 0.37 0.24 0.35
o - 0.0045 0.0(04 0.0(03 0.(02 0.013 0.014 0.010 00.9 0.046 (.06
Nobs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: The estimated regression, equation (1) in the text, is estimaed using OL.S using 2007 annual data
from 35 different countries and is given by
AR =-. + p/ ENDOW, + #1 RGDP, + PfRE(GIO(N, + ,c where E. N(0,o,2)
Table 5b. Cross-country differences in aggregate fuel intensity profiles
(AFI), without electricity
Combustables, Oil and
Renewables Petroleum (tydrocleciric Geothermal
and Waste Coal and Peat Products Natural Gas Nuclear Power Power Power
(f = 1) (ff = 2) (f, 3) (f. 4) (f = 5) (f, 6) (f, = 7)
Constant 0.99 1.21 0.36 -0.05 0.002 -0.2 40.4 .0.39 -0.18 0.013 0.06 0.1 0.0)2 003
(5.60) (4.81) (1.61) (-0.15) (0.01) (-0.48) 4.1.73) (-1.10) (.2.09) (0.10) (0.61) (0.78) (0.09) (087)
Europe . 0.06 . 0.06 0.09 . 0.02 . 0.03 . -0.01 0.01
(1.17) . (0.89) (-0.98) (0.30) . (1.13) . (-0.24) (092)
Developed Asia . -0.01 . 0.15 0.01 . .0.05 0.02 . -0.04 . -0001
(-0.20) . (.90) (-009) . (41.50) . (0.59) . (-1.14) (.0.05)
Ilin America . -0.02 . 0.03 002 . 0.04 -0.02 . 0.05 . 001
(-0.24) (0.42) (0.17) . (0.49) (.0.68) . (1.39) . (-065)
Emerging Asia -0.01 0.19 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 . -0.04 .- 0.002
(-0.21) (2.48) (-0.009) . (-0.17) (.0.75) . (-1.38) (-0.18)
Emerging Other . 010 0.06 0.04 -0.1 -0.02 .- 0.04 . 0.02
((.39) (0.81) (0.37) . (-1.02) (.0.52) . (-1.28) (1.61)
Economic Development -0.21 -0.26 .0.06 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.003 0.01 -0.01 0.001 -0.01
(-.04) (-4.68) (-1.18) (0.19) (1.84) (1.84) (2.61) (1.73) (142) (0.10) (023) (041) (0.20) (-0.79)
Resource -ndowment . 0.06 0.62 0.91 -0.08 1.58 2.06 . .
(1.89) (12.07) (0.07) (.0.05) (3.52) (3.49) .
R 0.44 0.58 0.14 0.43 0.11 x.xx 0.36 0.43 0.15 0.31 0.002 0.39 0.001 0.22
n 2 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.0(2 8.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.0001
Nobs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Noles: lTe estimated regression, equation (1) in the text, is estimtacd using OLS using 2007 annual data
from 35 different countries and is given by
AFM = W+ P9 ENDOW, + 9/ RGDP, + PfRIEGION. + e. where c. - N(0.o.2)
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Table 6. End-use consumption profile
Industry
(S = 1)









0.097 0.198 0.545 35
0.087 0.216 0.513 19
0.071 0.390 0.545 16
0.112 0.198 0.508 4
Residential and Commercial
(S = 3)
Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N
Transportation
(S = 2)
Mean Median St. Dcv. Min. Max. N
0.290 0.294 0.093 0.104 0.522 35
0.294 0.294 0.075 0.173 0.443 19
0.184 0.163 0.096 0.104 0.307 16
0.318 0.317 0.099 0.168 0.522 4
Agriculture
(S = 4)









0.097 0.143 0.534 35 0.025
0.073 0.194 0.475 19 0.025
0.122 0.166 0.461 16 0.041













Industrial Transportation Commercial Agriculture
(S 1) (S 2) (S 3) (S = 4)
Constant -3.83 -6.61 -2.52 -0.55 7.70 8.61 -0.65 -0.43
(-1.71) (-2.64) (-1.13) (-0.19) (4.00) (3.92) (-1.48) (-0.79)
Europe . 0.04 . -0.11 . 0.06 . 0.004
(0.79) . (-1.77) . (1.34) . (0.37)
Developed Asia . 0.11 . -0.11 . 0.008 . -0.01
(1.65) . (-1.47) . (0.14) . (-0.64)
Latin America . 0.004 . -0.02 . 0.03 . 0.001
(0.06) . (-0.27) . (0.49) . (0.07)
Emerging Asia . 0.05 . -0.07 . 0.04 . -0.02
(0.77) . (-0.98) . (0.69) . (-1.24)
Emerging Other . -0.14 . -0.03 . 0.19 . -0.09
(-1.96) . (-0.42) . (2.98) . (-0.63)
Economic Development 2.11 3.45 1.32 0.36 -3.62 -4.07 0.29 0.19
(1.91) (2.81) (1.21) (0.25) (-3.87) (-3.79) (1.43) (0.74)
Economic Development (Squared) -0.26 -0.43 -0.15 -0.03 0.44 0.49 -0.03 -0.02
(-1.95) (-2.86) (-1.15) (-0.18) (3.89) (3.79) (1.34) (-0.67)
Sector Size 0.06 0.06 -0.48 -0.84 0.17 0.32 0.31 0.37
(0.32) (0.34) (-0.52) (-0.85) (0.51) (0.98) (2.19) (2.41)
Efficiency 0.64 1.28 0.14 0.02 -1.08 -1.68 0.32 0.37
(0.61) (1.31) (0.13) (0.02) (-1.24) (-2.06) (0.15) (0.15)
R2  0.24 0.52 0.11 0.25 0.41 0.61 0.21 0.36
C 2 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001
Nobs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: The estimated regression, equation (2) in the text, is estimtaed using 2SLS using 2007 annual data
from 35 different countries and is given by
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Table 10. Cross-country differences in end-use energy consumption and
the BRIC economies, by sector (SEU)
Sector
Residential and
Industrial Transportation Commercial Agriculture
(S 1) (S 2) (S 3) (S 4)
Constant -4.92 -7.63 0.03 1.11 6.48 7.83 -0.59 -0.32
(-1.79) (-2.75) (0.01) (0.37) (3.03) (3.52) (-1.12) (-0.47)
Europe . 0.03 . -0.10 . 0.06 . 0.01
. (0.65) . (-1.90) (1.63) . (0.54)
Developed Asia . 0.09 . -0.14 . 0.04 . 0.01
. (1.45) . (-1.94) . (0.76) . (0.32)
Latin America . -0.01 . -0.09 . 0.09 . 0.01
S (-0.20) . (-1.12) . (1.67) . (0.36)
Emerging Asia . 0.04 . -0.10 . 0.07 . -0.01
(0.63) . (-1.51) . (1.43) . (-0.14)
Emerging Other . -0.19 . -0.02 . 0.22 . -0.01
(-2.58) . (-0.24) . (3.72) . (0.29)
Brazil 0.07 0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.69) (0.74) (0.39) (-0.41) (-1.56) (-0.60) (0.83) (0.76)
Russia 0.11 0.19 -0.14 -0.25 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01
(0.94) (1.56) (-1.28) (-1.85) (0.09) (0.47) (0.90) (0.39)
India -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.17 0.13 0.21 -0.01 -0.003
(-0.23) (-0.43) (-1.07) (-1.65) (1.64) (2.84) (-0.30) (-0.14)
China 0.15 0.15 -0.21 -0.29 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.01
(1.50) (1.55) (-2.30) (-2.74) (0.66) (1.74) (0.55) (0.29)
Economic Development 2.58 3.86 0.03 -0.45 -2.92 -3.60 0.32 0.19
(1.93) (2.88) (0.03) (-0.31) (-2.81) (-3.35) (1.22) (0.57)
Economic Development (Squared) -0.31 -0.47 0.00 0.06 0.35 0.43 -0.04 -0.02
(-1.95) (-2.90) (0.01) (0.34) (2.80) (3.35) (-1.26) (-0.62)
Sector Size 0.09 0.18 0.33 0.36 -037 -0.50 -0.05 -0.04
(0.45) (1.02) (1.81) (1.85) (-2.39) (-3.52) (-1.32) (-0.97)
Efficiency 0.48 0.65 0.10 -0.31 -0.76 -0.53 2.16 2.11
(0.42) (0.66) (0.09) (-0.28) (-0.86) (-0.66) (0.83) (0.72)
R2 0.33 0.63 0.38 0.52 0.59 0.76 0.22 0.31
o2 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001
Nobs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: The estimated regression, equation (2) in the text, is estimtaed using 2SLS using 2007 annual data
from 35 different countries and is given by
SEU = pl + pfiSIZE,, + N/EFFICIENCY,., + PfRGDF' + PjRGDII,,2 + Ps'REGION, + ifBRIC. + E,
where En - N(0,o,2)
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